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Purpose: This paper contributes to debates about environmental policy in 
developing countries by examining how far sustainable livelihoods approaches 
(SLAs) to development may allow an alternative, and less universalistic approach to 
environmental changes such as soil erosion.  
 
Approach: The paper provides an overview of debates about environmental 
narratives and SLAs. There are tensions in both debates, about how far local 
institutions represent adaptations to predefined environmental risks, or instead 
enable a redefinition of risks according to the experience of poor people. In addition, 
there is a tension in how far SLAs should be seen as a fixed institutional design, or 
as a framework for organizing ideas and concerns about development. The paper 
presents research on soil erosion in Thailand as a case study of how SLAs can 
redefine risks from erosion for poor people. 
 
Findings: SLAs provide a more contextual analysis of how environmental changes 
such as soil erosion represent risk to different land users, and hence SLAs can make 
environmental interventions more relevant for reducing vulnerability. But this 
approach can only succeed if intervener agencies are willing to consider challenging 
pre-existing environmental narratives in order to empower local livelihoods. 
 
Originality of paper: The paper adds to existing research on SLAs by exploring the 
implications of SLAs for redefining environmental assumptions. The paper forms part 
of work aiming to make debates about the politics of environmental knowledge and 
science more practically relevant within development policy. 
 
Conceptual Paper / Research Paper 
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In many upland areas of developing countries today, environmental policies are 
based on universal assumptions about the nature and causes of environmental 
risk(e.g. Kasperson and Kasperson, 2001). For example, in the mountains of 
northern Thailand, environmental risk is defined in terms of soil erosion and its 
potential impact on watershed properties. As a result, government policies seek to 
control erosion by restricting upland agriculture, relocating villages from the uplands, 
or covering large areas of land with teak and pine plantations. 
 This approach to environmental risk, however, is now increasingly challenged 
(Lash et al, 1996; Wisner et al, 2004). A growing number of researchers are instead 
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urging that environmental risk should be seen more contextually, and less on the 
basis of universal assumptions about biophysical causes of risk. Yet, despite much 
discussion about the need for alternative approaches, researchers are still uncertain 
about how to implement policies that do not adopt universal approaches to 
environmental risk.  
 This paper considers the ways in which Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches 
(SLAs) to development may be used for this purpose. SLAs have been adopted by 
development agencies since the 1990s as a way to reduce vulnerability and poverty 
through means such as income diversification and agricultural intensification 
(Scoones, 1998; Carney, 2003). Influenced by scholars such as Robert Chambers 
and Amartya Sen, SLAs aim to strengthen local resilience by enhancing institutions 
governing access to livelihoods and resources. Some analysts have claimed SLAs 
may allow poor people to adapt to, or reduce, environmental degradation by aligning 
environmental policy more with local environmental perceptions and vulnerability. 
But, some critics claim more work is required to make SLAs effective for governance 
(Arce, 2003), and their implications for governing environmental risks can be 
developed further.  
 The paper explores the potential use of SLAs in less universalistic environmental 
policy by considering soil erosion in the uplands of northern Thailand. 
 
 
Northern Thailand and approaches to soil erosion 
The highlands of northern Thailandi commonly inspire images of teak forests, 
Buddhist temples, lush green rice fields and remote hillside villages inhabited by 
colorful ‘hill tribes.’ Although the region is by no means as high as the snow-capped 
Himalayan ranges further west (northern Thailand’s highest peak, Doi Inthanon, is 
just 2,565 meters above sea level), the region is the most consistently mountainous 
region of Thailand. It is also the most remote region, with many valleys and hillsides 
unconnected to transport routes, and was only politically integrated into the rest of 
Thailand in the twentieth century.  
 Classically, the region of northern Thailand has contained two main ethnic 
groups: the lowland Thai (khonmuang), who traditionally inhabited irrigated 
intermontane basins; and upland minorities (so-called ‘hill tribes’ or chao khao), who 
historically practiced forms of shifting cultivation in the uplands. Upland minorities 
have also been divided into ethnic groups who have either lived in Thailand for as 
long as the lowland Thai (such as the Karen), and those who have migrated to 
Thailand from neighboring Burma, Laos and China during the twentieth century, and 
who typically cultivated opium. Some early studies of shifting cultivation in the region 
classified these groups into those using so-called ‘pioneer’ forms of shifting 
cultivation, such as the Hmong, Mien and Akha (who relocated villages every 10-20 
years in search of more land); and ‘rotational’ cultivators, such as the Karen (who 
rotated agricultural plots around semi-permanent settlements) (Grandstaff, 1980). In 
recent decades, however, these distinctions have become blurred as both Thai and 
minorities inhabit the uplands, and forms of shifting cultivation have been replaced by 
more permanent and commercialized agriculture. 
 Both historic and current forms of upland cultivation have been blamed for 
causing environmental degradation, and particularly erosion. These views have had 
long pedigrees. The British colonial scientist, O.H.K. Spate (1945), writing about 
comparable areas in Burma, commented: ‘naturally, these practices are attended 
with serious deforestation and soil erosion.’ More recently, permanent agriculture has 
also been blamed for erosion as it reduces fallow periods and increases the intensity 
of land use. Some observers also fear that historic ‘pioneer’ shifting cultivators may 
not understand the potential long-term impacts of permanent agriculture. In 1987, the 
Bangkok think-tank, Thailand Development Research Institute (1987, p. 296) wrote: 
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Whereas slash and burn agriculture was once more closely attuned with 
the ecosystems exploited, it now causes untold ecological damages … In 
the process, major watersheds are being denuded, with increasing silt 
loads washed down into the nation’s rivers [and] silting up dams. 
 
Deforestation is blamed for erosion for it reduces the canopy cover of soil, and 
frequently removes trees from the ground, and disturbs soil. Cultivation also takes 
place on steep slopes, which encourages erosion. Sediment from the hills is also 
blamed for silting up lowland dams and rivers. Erosion of soil is also considered to 
reduce its water-holding properties, which is seen to exacerbate lowland water 
shortages. 
 Critics have also claimed opium-substitution policies cause environmental 
degradation. During the 1980s, various development agencies sought to replace 
opium cultivation with alternative, cash-based export crops such as cabbages, soya 
beans and strawberries. These crops have been criticized for either exposing too 
much upland land to rainfall and for providing too little binding of upland soils. 
Moreover, some NGO workers have also considered that attempts to integrate 
upland minorities within wider commercial networks may destabilize historic balances 
between farmers and the fragile upland environment. One upland-NGO worker 
wrote: 
 
Traditionally, the hill tribes used slash and burn tactics in a limited way – 
just to produce food for their families. But in trying to produce cash crops 
and satisfy the demands of the market, the tribes surpassed the natural 
capacities of the land, degraded by deforestation and erosion (Tuenjai, 
2000, p. 1). 
 
And some environmental NGOs have been even more explicit about the threat of 
erosion that may result from upland agriculture: 
 
Heavy rains wash away the soil, which quickly silts up dams, reservoirs 
and rivers. ... Every rainy season now, lowland paddies are buried under 
2-3 meters of sand. … The evergreen headwater forest should be areas of 
strict conservation as their removal brings about environmental disaster 
(Svasti, 1998). 
 
 Consequently, various government and NGO initiatives have sought to enforce 
environmental policies that reduce agricultural pressure on upland soils. Policies 
include relocating villages from locations considered especially fragile for soil 
erosion; placing restrictions on cultivation on steep slopes; and reforesting large 
areas of land with teak and pine plantations. Plantations are claimed to help reduce 
erosion by protecting soil surfaces, and by reducing the need for upland agriculture 
by offering livelihoods in maintaining plantations instead. Grass strips on steep 
slopes have also been used, which aim to prevent erosion by reducing the length of 
the slope (and hence the ability for water on slopes to gather speed). Most 
significantly, large areas of northern Thailand are now under various categories of 
protected land such as national parks and wildlife sanctuaries, which restrict 
agriculture. Currently, about 50 percent of the total northern region is classified as 
conservation forest. In some highly forested provinces such as Nan, conservation 
forest covers 80 percent of the provincial area (Ewers, 2003). 
 
 
Questioning these concerns 
Yet, these worries about soil erosion in northern Thailand may also be criticized for 
various reasons. 
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 First, much research has questioned the assumptions made about causes and 
effects of erosion in Thailand. For example, research in the similar topography of the 
Middle Hills of Nepal has indicated that popular debates overlook the immense 
variation in environmental processes across time and space, and the role of non-
anthropogenic causes of erosion such as monsoon rainfall and tectonic uplift (Ives 
and Messerli, 1989; Ives, 2004). In particular, many deep gullies that dissect upland 
areas may be naturally occurring (Smadje, 1992:7). Other hydrological research 
elsewhere has questioned how far land-cover changes such as deforestation are 
necessarily linked to water shortages. Indeed, planting large-scale tree plantations 
may even decrease lowland supplies of water (Calder, 1999; Bruijnzeel, 2004). 
 A related finding is that estimates of soil erosion coming from the Universal Soil 
Loss Equation (USLE) (adopted as a guide in the USA after the so-called ‘Dust Bowl’ 
crisis of the 1930s) may be overstated in tropical regions (Hallsworth, 1987). 
Research has suggested that the USLE may simplify factors such as rainfall intensity 
(particularly the influence of storms) or the length of slopes, where farming practices 
provide breaks in slopes. Moreover, the USLE may focus too exclusively on erosion 
rather than on declining soil fertility caused by exhaustion of nutrients. In northern 
Thailand, slopes are frequently divided into complex household plots, and rainfall 
falls mainly between June and October, often in storms. In one study, Thitirojanawat 
and Chareonsuk (2000) found that the USLE predicted rates of soil loss in Nan 
province 104 times greater than those actually observed in run-off plots! 
 Second, research has also suggested that many farmers may mitigate 
environmental change by careful practices of adaptation. For example, classic 
research on shifting cultivation has argued that farmers are more skilled in managing 
species diversity and soil fertility than commonly thought (Conklin, 1954). Research 
has also questioned the relationship of upland cultivation and erosion. In Nepal’s 
Middle Hills, anthropologists found that some hill farmers actually use landslides 
opportunistically to assist in the creation of terraced land, and that landslides may 
renew soil fertility by turning over soil (Kienholz et al, 1984; Ives and Messerli, 
1989:90). Perhaps most famously, Tiffen and Mortimore’s (1994) study in Machakos, 
Kenya, demonstrated that ‘more people’ could mean ‘less erosion’ if farmers were 
able to build terraces, instigate soil conservation, and identify opportunities for trade 
and income diversification. 
 And thirdly, some analysts have argued controversially that fixed visions of 
environmental risk, such as those concerning soil erosion in northern Thailand, 
should be understood politically as attempts to legitimize state interventions and 
systems of control (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). Sociologists of scientific knowledge 
have given the name ‘environmental narratives’ to some fixed notions concerning 
environmental risks, to indicate how very simple cause-and-effect stories have 
become accepted as incontestable, when in fact they are less certain than assumed. 
‘Crisis narratives,’ Roe (1995, p. 1066) argued, ‘are the primary means whereby 
development experts and the institutions for which they work claim rights to 
stewardship over land and resources they do not own.’ And Hajer (1995, pp. 64-65) 
wrote: ‘Storylines [or narratives] are devices through which actors are positioned, 
and through which specific ideas of “blame” and “responsibility” and ”urgency” and 
“responsible behaviour” are attributed’. 
 Consequently, analysts have argued that many fixed beliefs about the cause and 
effect of environmental problems serve political purposes in enforcing notions of 
social order or political authority that may not be as easy to achieve without these 
visions of risk. 
 How do these fixed visions of risk, or environmental narratives, occur? Scholars 
have argued that narratives ‘stabilize’ complex and uncertain biophysical events or 
change processes, in order to offer a managerially convenient summary of cause 
and effect. For example, in Guinea in West Africa, Fairhead and Leach (1996) 
argued that the state has blamed smallholder agriculturalists for deforestation 
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because it believes population growth and inappropriate agriculture have contributed 
to the decline in forest areas. However, research that Fairhead and Leach 
summarize has shown that villagers have actually contributed to the conservation of 
forest areas, and that divisions between closed and savanna forest are complex and 
variable. Yet, as a result of the narrative, the government of Guinea has been able to 
defend a centralized approach to environmental policymaking, and instigate various 
restrictions on agriculture in rural areas. 
 One important concept in creating environmental narratives is ‘problem closure,’ 
which is when one specific definition of a problem is used to frame subsequent 
generation of knowledge about environmental causes and effects (Hajer 1995, p. 
22). Problem closure also reflects dominant patterns in society and politics, as well 
as the definition of technical expertise and who is allowed to participate in scientific 
discussion. Listening to alternative social needs, or diversifying the definition of 
expertise might therefore produce alternative forms of knowledge. In northern 
Thailand, the historic divisions between ‘uplanders’ and ‘lowlanders,’ or ethnic 
minorities and Thais, as well as the desire of the state to bring this region under 
greater political control, seem prime ground for environmental narratives to emerge. 
 These various concerns have led analysts to argue that approaches to 
environmental risk should not be based on universal and predefined notions of cause 
and effect, but instead should be defined more flexibly, case by case. It is important 
to ask how far environmental changes present problems for different people; how far 
people are able to adapt to changes; and how far the definition of risk itself may 
affect their own political and socio-economic status. But at the same time, there is 
still uncertainty about how to integrate these concerns into an alternative form of 
environmental policy that can avoid the problems of oversimple standardized 
narratives.  
 In particular, it is not clear if more flexible approaches to environmental risk imply 
the need for greater adaptations to known risks, or the need to redefine the nature of 
risk in a more fundamental way. For example, Tiffen and Mortimore’s work assumes 
that erosion is still a problem, even if people can adapt to, or avoid, it. In contrast, 
research in the Himalayas has suggested that erosion is not necessarily the chief 
cause of degradation, and that declining soil fertility, or overall lack of productive 
land, is a more accurate indication of what restricts livelihoods (Ives, 2004). 
Consequently, should alternative approaches to environmental policy still mean 
building institutions against predefined risks, or instead allow local people to 
reformulate the perception of risks? 
 One possible route for more flexible approaches to environmental risk lies 
through Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches (SLAs). 
 
 
Sustainable Livelihoods and environmental risk 
 
Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches (SLAs) within development studies are 
generally traced to the work of Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway (1992), who 
argued that one can reduce poverty and vulnerability by increasing livelihood options 
especially during times of economic or environmental stress. They wrote: 
 
[a sustainable livelihood] can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, 
maintain and enhance its capabilities and assets and provide sustainable 
livelihood opportunities for the next generation; [it] contributes net benefits to 
other livelihoods at the local and global level and in the short and long term 
(Chambers and Conway, 1992:1). 
 
 This and later discussions of SLAs have also been influenced by Amartya Sen’s 
concepts of endowments, entitlements and capabilities, which discuss how poor 
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people can access resources and livelihood options (Scoones, 1998; Carney, 2003). 
Endowments (and the related term of assets) cover a variety of types of resources 
(tangible and intangible notably including institutional arrangements) that may allow 
individuals to achieve livelihoods and their chosen potential, Capabilities are the 
range of valued life-options (including life-paths over time) that people can attain 
(Alkire, 2002). SLAs seek to make institutional arrangements that guarantee a range 
of livelihood options, which can reduce the vulnerability and poverty of individuals. 
The term, ‘sustainable’ refers to different aspects of longevity: economic, institutional, 
social and environmental (Carney, 2003, p. 27).  
 SLAs may be described in various forms, but some authors have argued that the 
essence of SLAs should be to flexible, and avoid having specific institutional designs 
that may restrict local determination of assets and capabilities (Ellis, 2000; 
Hinshelwood, 2003). Figure 1 shows one diagrammatic representation of SLA, which 
avoids having predefined lines of activity between local development problems (the 
vulnerability context), state-based policy contexts, and the middle-level development 
interventions that affect assets, activities and outcomes. 
 










POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
laws & rightsgovernment democracy
 
 
Source: adapted from Scoones (1998), Ellis (2000) 
 
 
 Self-determination of livelihoods and risks is a further key feature of SLA. 
Proponents hold that: 
 
Poor people themselves must be key actors in identifying and addressing 
livelihood priorities. Outsiders need processes that enable them to listen 
and respond to the poor (Ashley and Carney, 1999, p. 7). 
and 
Sustainable livelihood approaches call for constant questioning of common 
assumptions and repeated reference to the effects of policy and actions on 
the livelihoods of the poor (Carney, 2003, p. 32). 
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 Consequently, SLAs may be compatible with non-universal notions of 
environmental risk because they allow poor people to define risks as they perceive 
them. In effect, this means the problem closure of environmental interventions is 
derived from the perceptions of local vulnerability by poor people, rather than on the 
basis of predefined narratives about cause and effect. 
 
 This specific use of SLAs for local determination of risks has not always been 
made explicit in some adaptations of SLAs by development agencies and research 
institutes since the late 1990s (such as, for example the UK’s Department for 
International Development, DFID). These uses of SLAs have instead developed 
three themes that may assist in social and economic access to livelihoods. SLAs 
have now generally focused upon furnishing different types of ‘capital’ as resources 
for livelihoods. Usually five capitals are identified: natural (natural resources), 
physical (infrastructure, technology); financial (loans); human (personnel and 
training); and social (social cohesiveness). Second, livelihood strategies have been 
defined as agricultural intensification or extensification, livelihood diversification, and 
limited forms of migration. And thirdly, the ability to achieve or access these 
livelihoods have been seen as determined by a range of formal and informal 
organizational and institutional factors that influence sustainable livelihood outcomes 
(Scoones, 1998; Bebbington, 1999). Indeed, these three themes have been used as 
part of a tentative institutional design of the SLA that is transferable between 
contexts. 
 Despite these advances, some critics have claimed SLAs are still insufficiently 
developed in political terms, or as tools of local governance. Some have suggested 
that SLAs should be reformulated as rights-based approaches in development, 
where participation is defined as the right to assert needs, rather than a ‘sham 
participation’ in policymaking by poor people (Baumann, 2000, p. 34; Carney, 2003). 
At another level, others have claimed that an emphasis on institutional design and 
diverse ‘capitals’ (such as natural, social, etc.) has made SLA ‘merely a confused 
diagram and a wordy manual’ and that we should instead realize ‘community work is 
not easily captured in a diagram’ (Hinselwood, 2003, pp. 254, 243). This kind of 
argument underlies the desire to have flexibility in how SLAs are designed and 
described (as in Figure 1). Moreover, Arce (2003, p. 204) has argued that using 
words such as ‘capitals’ in uncritical, easily transferred, ways may reduce the ability 
for local people to assert their own values in framing development policy.  
 In environmental terms too, there are questions about how SLA is applied. On 
one hand, some analysts have agreed that SLA implies a more livelihoods-focused 
approach for defining risk and resources. According to Scoones (1998, pp. 6-7), 
 
Natural resource base sustainability refers to the ability of a system to maintain 
productivity when subject to disturbing forces… This implies avoiding depleting 
stocks of natural resources to a level which results in an effectively permanent 
decline in the rate at which the natural resource base yields useful products or 
services for livelihoods. 
 
In addition, DFID (2002) has argued that SLA can challenge some key environmental 
narratives that poor people cause or cannot adapt to environmental degradation. 
This approach fully adopts the new problem closure offered under SLAs because it 
allows poor people to define both environmental problems and sustainable 
development because they are linked to activities that may reduce their vulnerability 
and secure sustainable livelihoods. This approach therefore gives precedence to 
poor people’s definitions and uses of natural resources as a way to reduce 
vulnerability, rather than necessarily allow resources or environmental problems to 
be defined by other means.  
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 In contrast, some environmental applications of SLAs have still adopted 
predefined definitions of risk, and instead have seen SLAs as ways to encourage 
local institutional adaptations to these risks. For example, writing about SLA and 
environmental science, Ashby (2003, p. 2) wrote: ‘A reversal of environmental 
degradation requires new livelihood options that change people’s incentives, in 
particular, the benefits and costs of resource use.’  This approach suggests that 
livelihood activities should be seen as operating in response to known risks and 
known potential damage to resources, rather than as redefining these risks or 
valuations of resources from the perspective of reducing local poverty and 
vulnerability. Similarly, a report from the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture 
Organization has discussed SLA as a form of local institution that exists alongside 
methods of environmental protection, rather than as also a form of environmental 
protection itself. The report wrote: 
 
An environmentally protected area, such as a park or game reserve, represents a 
particular type of local institution that could link with the livelihoods of people 
living in the area in several ways… Successful conservation of wild animals 
within the area might increase the vulnerability of people living outside by having 
their crops destroyed or their lives threatened. On the other hand, in the longer 
term it may reduce people’s vulnerability to natural disasters like drought or 
flooding by protecting watersheds, wetlands and local microclimates… (Messer 
and Townsley, 2003, pp. 16-7). 
 
Such statements overlook the epistemological potential of SLAs by defining both the 
risks and the institutions in terms of outsiders, rather than acknowledging how the 
definition of livelihood strategies and risks are linked by poor people. Moreover, this 
statement adopts cause and effect statements about watershed and climate 
protection that may reflect simplistic environmental narratives. In this case, it seems 
that discussion of SLAs has been added on top of pre-existing notions of 
environmental risk, rather than being a way to specify this risk using the perspectives 
of vulnerable people. 
 SLAs therefore have been proposed as ways to build institutions around poor 
people’s perceptions of resources and vulnerability. Critics have suggested that 
SLAs may still be dominated by outsiders’ priorities for policy. Moreover, the link with 
environmental risks may still be developed further. The following example from 
Thailand tries to indicate how far SLAs can enable a more locally determined 
approach to defining environmental risk. 
 
 
Example: soil erosion and livelihoods in northern Thailand  
The topic of sustainable livelihoods has been researched to a limited extent in 
Thailand (Parnwell, 2005), but these studies have not focused on SLAs’ role in 
environmental analysis. Various other development interventions have adopted 
insights from SLAs, even if they have not formally claimed this. The following 
examples of research on erosion and livelihoods indicate possibilities for integrating 
SLAs with non-universalistic approaches to environmental risk. 
 The first study is based on research by the author (Forsyth, 1996, updated by 
fieldwork, 2004-5) on land cultivated by the Mien ethnic group.ii The Mien were 
traditional ‘pioneer’ shifting cultivators, who have learned to adopt permanent and 
commercialized agriculture since their arrival at this site in 1947. The population has 
grown from 110 in 1947 to about 1,200 in 2005. Historically, the staple crops of the 
Mien were rice, maize and opium. Since the 1980s, opium cultivation has been 
abandoned, and farmers have also cultivated soybeans, ginger and peanuts, with 
limited amounts of coffee, oranges and lychee. 
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 This study asked how farmers responded to soil degradation, including its impact 
on livelihoods. Historic aerial photographs, land surveys and a Geographical 
Information System (GIS) were used to identify how far land use had been 
concentrated on steep slopes.iii These categories were then physically measured 
for erosion in order to to indicate the range of historic soil erosion that had occurred 
in this region.iv Farmers were then interviewed about their perceptions of soil 
degradation and its impacts on decisions about livelihoods. 
 The study yielded various findings. First, the GIS map and interviews with 
villagers indicated that farmers were aware that steeper slopes generated more 
erosion, and that this was considered responsible for declining soil fertility in these 
regions. Yet, consequently, farmers had used less steep land more frequently, which 
generated less erosion, but which was more likely to experience exhaustion of soil 
nutrients. Consequently, erosion was indeed considered a risk, but farmers tried to 
avoid it, and this was shown by the ‘most eroded’ category of land being just 5 
percent of the total study area. The physical measurements of erosion indicated 
rates of 24 and 64 tons per hectare per year 1963 -1991 for the ‘least’ and ‘most’ 
eroded categories of land respectively. The higher of these rates is indeed 
considered high in Thailand and elsewhere (e.g. Nipon, 1991), but the role of 
agriculture in generating these levels may be relatively low because farmers avoid 
these slopes. 
 Second, gullies in this area of Thailand may result from naturally occurring 
weathering of granite, rather than from agricultural practices. The GIS data indicated 
a marked absence of relatively gentle slopes of between 10 and 20 percent, which 
was apparent in the landscape which consisted of hummocky, rounded land, and 
gullies of some 1-2 meters depth in-between. This has been described as an ‘all-
slopes-topography,’ which is found on granite land in other locations (such as Brazil, 
see Twidale 1982, p. 177). Furthermore, villagers explained that these gullies existed 
before the establishment of the village; that they occurred on both forested and 
agricultural land; and that villagers preferred to keep them vegetated in order to 
harvest plants. These gullies may therefore be non-agricultural contributors to upland 
erosion and lowland sedimentation. 
 And thirdly, farmers explained that – despite their attempts to avoid erosion – soil 
fertility was declining, and that inorganic fertilizer was now considered necessary. 
Indeed, surveys indicate that fertilizer use has growth from just 5 percent of 
households to 100 percent between 1991 and 2005. Detailed discussions also 
revealed that farmers had adopted a new system of local land tenure during the early 
1970s (after some 25 years of settlement), which allocated land to specific 
households and families (earlier there had been an open-access system). This new 
system of land tenure encouraged farmers to cultivate land continuously in order to 
demonstrate that they intended to keep the land, an innovation that they hoped 
would enhance their formal tenure security. Moreover, the proportion of household 
members working in cities, or engaging in circular migration to earn remittances was 
increasing. 
 The second study was conducted by Turkelboom (1999) among the Akha 
people, some 15km from the Mien site, at Pakha in Chiang Rai province.v The Akha 
are also historically ‘pioneer’ cultivators, although this village was established in 
1976. Farmers cultivate irrigated and rain-fed rice, as well as cabbage, beans and 
tree crops. The study used a combination of experimental plots, erosion surveys and 
participatory discussions with farmers. The study asked how farmers were 
responding to erosion and land shortage, and how these impacted on livelihoods. 
 First, the study found that agriculture was indeed increasing erosion. Tillage 
erosion was apparent because farmers experienced declining soil fertility at the top 
of steep slopes, in locations where water erosion was less likely to occur because of 
the comparative lack of slope length. Gully erosion was also evident. This village 
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also had deep, naturally occurring gullies between convex slopes. But there were 
also smaller gullies on agricultural land that did not occur under forest cover, of some 
10 to 15 centimeters in depth. These gullies apparently resulted from overland flow 
generated during rainfall on steep slopes, or when water ran onto slopes from other 
sources, such as from roads. Sometimes landslips occurred when streams or paths 
undercut slopes. The erosion on slopes, however, was also found to increase soil 
fertility when soil was deposited on lower slopes, around lines of crops, or on leveled 
land. Yet, despite this erosion, it seemed clear that erosion on slopes did not lead to 
lowland sedimentation because only a third of agricultural slopes fed stream 
networks (and thus deposited soil would remain in place). Moreover, soil was 
deposited on slopes as steep as 60 percent, and hence steep slopes need not 
always generate net outflows of sediment. 
 Second, however, farmers were aware of these problems and adopted various 
methods of soil conservation. Mulching reduced the impacts of erosion during the 
early weeks of cultivation of some crops such as ginger. Diversion channels – or 
small trenches 10 to 20 centimeters deep – were drawn across fields to reduce water 
flow, and to demarcate field ownership. Tree crops on slopes were also increasing, 
partly because some farmers saw them as a more reliable source of income. Yet, 
farmers agreed soil fertility was declining. Some elders liked to tell the mythological 
story of a giant, underground snake or pig-like monster (‘pjengcha’) that caused 
landslips and political havoc every 13 years. Others reported ‘you can see the bones 
through the soil now’ or that ‘the land is becoming like old people—they are not 
strong enough to hold anything anymore’ (Turkelboom 1999, pp. 172, 190). 
 Thirdly, erosion arising from new commercial crops was not as bad as 
suggested. Rain-fed rice (the most ‘traditional’ Akha crop) had the highest rates of 
erosion: 60 tons per hectare per crop cycle. Maize and beans were least erosive with 
median soil losses of respectively 19 and 10 tons per hectare per crop cycle. Erosion 
in cabbage fields lay in between these two extremes. Importantly, this study 
measured erosion under cropping systems (with reference to the timing and manner 
of cultivation) rather than according to crops or slopes alone. Consequently, the 
months when cabbage had only a small surface area were generally during the dry 
season, when rainfall erosion was least. Moreover, if the price of cabbage fell, 
farmers would abandon fields, allowing them to be invaded by grass and hence be 
further protected against erosion. 
 Yet, perhaps most importantly, this study also showed it is important not to 
generalize about farmers. Turkelboom (1999, pp. 208-211) identified five levels of 
entrepreneurialism or concern for soil conservation: secure investors (who owned 
paddy fields and fruit plantations); profit maximizers (adopting high-risk crops such 
as cabbage); diversifiers (farmers who mix rice cultivation with limited cash crops); 
survivors (those who cultivated only rice on a short-term basis); and dropouts (who 
relied solely on wage labour and petty business). The survivors accounted for some 
30 percent of the village. The point of this classification is to acknowledge soil and 
crop management does not take place uniformly across single ethnic groups, but that 
there is great diversity between and within households. 
 
 
Implications for sustainable livelihood approaches 
These two studies are relevant to sustainable livelihoods approaches (SLAs) 
because they concern the nature and response to environmental risks by poor 
people. They add to the debate about SLAs because they do not just demonstrate 
how villagers are adopting strategies such as agricultural intensification, economic 
diversification and limited migration. Instead, they also show that the very definition 
of SLAs, as responses to periods of environmental or economic stress, cannot be 
separated from the definitions of those risks. Three factors appear significant. 
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 First, despite the common beliefs that upland agriculture is a cause of erosion, 
and that environmental policies should control erosion directly, the studies 
demonstrate that assumptions about erosion are clearly simplistic. Erosion and 
sedimentation are not only caused by agricultural practices but by various non-
anthropogenic causes such as gullies; the topography of stream networks is 
important; and other factors such as the location and influence of roads on water and 
soil flows have to be acknowledged. Crop cycles, or the timing and management of 
different crops may also mitigate their impacts on erosion. Moreover, erosion need 
not represent the most important cause of soil degradation for upland farmers 
themselves, as declining soil fertility through repeated cultivation may be more 
significant. Indeed, local perceptions and responses to soil problems partly ensure 
that erosion is not as damaging as it might be. Consequently, the organizing vision 
for SLAs – or underlying problem closure – should clearly not be the belief that 
upland agriculture is causing erosion, and that stopping this erosion will prevent 
lowland sedimentation or upland declining soil fertility. 
 Second, soil erosion is clearly only part of the causes of risks to individual 
households. Households have different vulnerabilities, according to access to land, 
availability of labor to diversify into different economic activities, and in levels of 
entrepreneurialism. Erosion, or soil degradation in general, clearly affects most 
farmers in both studies, but the impact on overall household vulnerability is highly 
variable. Consequently, we should perhaps not ask whether ‘erosion’ is the 
appropriately predefined risk, but the extent to which erosion is potentially a risk 
because of the overall exposure of people to erosion. If the contribution of upland 
agriculture to erosion is not as high as thought, then perhaps it may be acceptable 
for farmers to achieve livelihoods through repeated cultivation if this is also 
conducted with the use of fertilizers and achieving income through supplementary 
sources.vi In this sense, therefore, we should not ask whether erosion is a predefined 
risk, but we should consider how far it might be a risk if resources of adaptation are 
not available. However, we can conclude that land shortage and declining 
agricultural productivity (if it occurs) are more certain risks for upland farmers, to 
which erosion may or may not contribute. 
 And thirdly, it is clear that some of the interventions proposed by environmental 
policies may actually significantly work against SLAs. Most directly, this may be 
caused by the removal of agricultural land through tree plantations. These studies 
therefore indicate that SLAs need to have local fora in which these dominant 
definitions of risk (or problem closures) can be challenged. To date, most 
discussions of SLAs have not really defined the settings in which livelihoods and 
environmental problems are defined, and some discussions of SLAs (such as those 
undertaken by Ashley and Messer and Townsley above) aim to place livelihood 
strategies within predefined environmental objectives. If SLAs are to emphasize the 
needs and perceptions of vulnerable poor people, then there needs to be more 
attention to how (and who)_defines environmental risks. In effect, this means 
ensuring that the assets and capabilities implied in a Sen-ian SLAs also imply rights 
over defining the objectives of sustainable livelihoods, and not allowing others to 
define these to the detriment of local people’s livelihood opportunities. 
 
 
Conclusion: deepening the impacts of Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches 
This paper has summarized debates about sustainable livelihoods approaches 
(SLAs) as a potential way to avoid fixed and universalistic attitudes to environmental 
risk. It illustrated this challenge with examples of research in the uplands of northern 
Thailand, and the disputed belief that environmental policy should focus on mitigating 
soil erosion. The paper showed two studies that demonstrated various perceptions of 
and adaptations to erosion by upland farmers, which challenged government 
assumptions and policies addressing upland degradation. 
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 In conclusion, I have argued that SLAs may allow environmental policy to avoid 
universalistic assumptions by organizing environmental interventions around more 
meaningful, locally governed notions of risk. This point needs to be given more 
attention within debates about SLAs because definitions of risk are fundamental to 
organizing interventions. Yet, many assumptions (or ‘narratives’) of risk are not 
necessarily appropriate, nor defined by people targeted by SLAs. 
 Some critics have voiced these views already. According to Arce (2003, p. 200), 
‘neither community development nor sustainable livelihood approaches are 
consistent idioms with a clear set of interrelated propositions.’ Consequently, Arce 
agrees that ‘the starting point of a SLA should be the actors’ reality’ (204). But is this 
happening? This paper argues that the means to achieve this local sensitivity is to 
move away from universalistic approaches to environmental risks, and instead 
acknowledge the local contexts in which risks exist, and how far adaptive capacity 
can make some environmental changes alone (such as erosion) less important 
indicators of risk. 
 Accordingly, SLAs should be seen in terms of a combination of local institutional 
design, plus a wider, less structured, basis for ideas (Hinshelwood, 2003). For SLAs 
to be effective, they must critique the organizing visions and discourses that define 
environmental risks in ways that exclude local consultation. This, of course, is a more 
complex and controversial undertaking, as it may challenge political objectives of 
government agencies, or social visions of how certain regions or peoples should be 
managed. Working locally within vulnerable people to define risks, and working 
elsewhere to challenge assumptions about risks may both build sustainable 
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i Usually the term, northern Thailand refers to the the upland areas in the provinces of Chiang 
Rai, Phayao, Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Mae Hong Son, Lampang, Nan, Phrae and Uttaradit, 
although administratively, the region also includes provinces further south. 
ii On underlying granite with sandy-clay soils at an average altitude of about 700 meters. 
iii The photographs and land survey allowed maps of dry-season land use to be made for the 
years, 1954, 1969, 1977, 1983 and 1991. The GIS then calculated susceptibility to erosion 
using the simple indicator of slop steepness. Each map was divided into categories to 
indicate ‘most’ and ‘least’ used or steep. The final map of predicted erosion was achieved by 
multiplying the two indices of slope steepness and historic land use together, and dividing this 
index into four quartiles, of which the highest and lowest quartiles indicated ‘most’ and ‘least’ 
eroded land. 
iv The study used the Cesium-137 method to measure soil erosion, which is based on the 
assumption that Cesium-137 isotopes were deposited evenly on soil after thermonuclear 
bomb tests of the 1950-60s. Soil erosion or sedimentation since this era can be measured by 
comparing isotopes between eroded and uneroded sites. Conventionally, this approach 
provides estimates of annual erosion since 1963 (the peak of isotope deposition), and soil 
measured to a depth of 25cm (Ritchie and McHenry 1990). 
v Underlain by granite, phyllite and shale, with sandy-clay soils, at an altitude of 7-900 meters. 
vi This point leaves undiscussed the question of the impact of fertilizers on soil and water 
quality, which this paper cannot do for reasons of space. 
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